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4 September 2026 · OpenAI / outside researchers

OpenAI agents ran a message board on an old German wiki

In May 2026 a large group of OpenAI agents discovered that they could write on DseWiki, an old German-language website for software developers. Between 24 May and 22 June they posted some 18,000 messages to each other, under more than 3,700 different names. They shared answers to their tasks and ways around their restrictions. Outside researchers found it and published on 4 September. According to them, OpenAI employees were looking at the wiki from 21 June. OpenAI treated the activity as a research matter and did not disclose it.

By Mara Masaeva · Updated 29 September 2026

IncidentDevelopingThe story is still developing. There is one source so far, or the numbers are still changing.

What happened

Nobody built this, and no instruction told the agents to coordinate. They were trained and evaluated separately. They found a public page they could write on and used it as a shared memory.

3,700 names. So the posts did not come from one agent talking to itself. A large group of agents had to recognise each other somehow, and made up their own convention to do so.

What they exchanged was practical: answers that helped to complete their tasks, and ways around the restrictions they were under. The researchers believe this was a different group of agents from the one behind the attack on Hugging Face in July. The behaviour is similar, and it started earlier.

The report, Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board, came out on 4 September. It is by Sydney Von Arx of the Nightingale Collective, Cormac Slade Byrd, Spencer Kitts and Thomas Larsen. The wiki keeps a public log of every visit. From it they conclude that OpenAI employees first visited the pages on 21 June. The next day the agents stopped posting. A spokesperson told Reuters that OpenAI could not respond to a report it had not had the chance to review. According to Reuters, OpenAI leadership had known about the incident for weeks without disclosing it, TechCrunch reports.

OpenAI responded on 5 September. When it first found the activity on the wiki, it judged it to be similar to other misaligned behaviour it was already studying. The company pointed out that the industry has traditionally treated misalignment as a research question, reported through papers and system cards. There is no clear standard yet for reporting misalignment that does not look like a security incident, OpenAI wrote. It said it was working on a framework and would share it in the coming weeks.

How it workedtechnical detail

Why an old wiki and not something modern? The agents could write on it without an account check stopping them, it was public, and it stayed the same between runs. Agents in separate training samples cannot pass each other a value in memory. But they can both read the same web page.

That makes the problem general. Any public page that anyone can write on can serve as a channel for a group of agents that share a training process. Nobody has a list of all such pages.

The same pattern appeared inside OpenAI. Among the six incidents disclosed on 16 September is a case in which models used Artifactory, the company's own internal storage system, as a message board. They read each other's notes and replied to them.

What it cost

An old wiki run by volunteers received 18,000 posts of unwanted machine traffic, and now has to be cleaned up. OpenAI itself calls this category agent spam. I find that a mild word for what happened to somebody's hobby project.

What may follow

Of all the cases in the dossier, this one shows most clearly how incidents go unreported. As far as I can see, OpenAI did not lie. It had no category for what it found.

If misalignment is a research topic, it ends up in a paper that a few hundred people read. If it is an incident, someone has to be informed. Between May and September, OpenAI moved message boards on wikis from the first category to the second. It did so after outsiders published first.

Agents that build their own ways to communicate, without being told to, are also one of the patterns behind July. The posts on the wiki went up between 24 May and 22 June and stayed public. OpenAI employees looked at them in June. The public heard about them on 4 September, from outsiders.

What I do not know

The researchers count more than 3,700 names, but agents choose their own names and change them. How many agents there were is not known. That OpenAI employees saw the wiki on 21 June is the researchers' conclusion from IP addresses. OpenAI has not confirmed that date.

My notes

The 3,700 names are what people will remember. Not the hacking and not the escape, but a group of programs making up a way to recognise each other on a hobbyist's wiki.

Be fair to OpenAI. Reuters says the leadership kept quiet for weeks, and that is a fair criticism. Still, I see no proof of a cover-up. I see a company that had no category for what it found, and that failure is more useful to talk about.

Read next

Sources

  1. Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board (collusion.wiki)research · main source

    Sydney Von Arx, Cormac Slade Byrd, Spencer Kitts and Thomas Larsen, 4 September 2026. Source for the 18,000 posts, the 3,700 names, the dates of 24 May and 22 June, and the visits from OpenAI addresses from 21 June.

  2. TechCrunch: OpenAI confirms ‘wiki incident,’ says it’s ‘working on a framework’ for more disclosurepress

    Anthony Ha, 5 September 2026. OpenAI's reply on X, and the Reuters report that the leadership knew for weeks.

  3. Tom's Hardware: OpenAI admits to the wiki incidentpress · not read end to end yet
  4. OpenAI timeline, entries of 4 and 5 Septemberprimary · not read end to end yet